与早期版本一样,Android 14 包含一些行为变更,这些变更可能会影响您的应用。以下行为变更仅影响以 Android 14 或更高版本为目标平台的应用。如果您的应用以 Android 14 或更高版本为目标平台,您应该修改自己的应用以适当地支持这些行为(如果适用)。
请务必查看对 Android 14 上运行的所有应用都有影响的行为变更列表(无论应用的 targetSdkVersion
如何)。
核心功能
前台服务类型是必填项
如果您的应用以 Android 14 为目标平台,则必须为应用中的每个前台服务至少指定一项前台服务类型。您应该选择一个能代表您的应用用例的前台服务类型。系统需要特定类型的前台服务满足特定用例。
如果应用中的用例与这些类型均不相关,强烈建议您迁移逻辑以使用 WorkManager 或用户发起的数据传输作业。
OpenJDK 17 更新
Android 14 continues the work of refreshing Android's core libraries to align with the features in the latest OpenJDK LTS releases, including both library updates and Java 17 language support for app and platform developers.
A few of these changes can affect app compatibility:
- Changes to regular expressions: Invalid group references are now
disallowed to more closely follow the semantics of OpenJDK. You might see
new cases where an
IllegalArgumentException
is thrown by thejava.util.regex.Matcher
class, so make sure to test your app for areas that use regular expressions. To enable or disable this change while testing, toggle theDISALLOW_INVALID_GROUP_REFERENCE
flag using the compatibility framework tools. - UUID handling: The
java.util.UUID.fromString()
method now does more strict checks when validating the input argument, so you might see anIllegalArgumentException
during deserialization. To enable or disable this change while testing, toggle theENABLE_STRICT_VALIDATION
flag using the compatibility framework tools. - ProGuard issues: In some cases, the addition of the
java.lang.ClassValue
class causes an issue if you try to shrink, obfuscate, and optimize your app using ProGuard. The problem originates with a Kotlin library that changes runtime behaviour based on whetherClass.forName("java.lang.ClassValue")
returns a class or not. If your app was developed against an older version of the runtime without thejava.lang.ClassValue
class available, then these optimizations might remove thecomputeValue
method from classes derived fromjava.lang.ClassValue
.
安全
对隐式 intent 和待处理 intent 的限制
For apps targeting Android 14, Android restricts apps from sending implicit intents to internal app components in the following ways:
- Implicit intents are only delivered to exported components. Apps must either use an explicit intent to deliver to unexported components, or mark the component as exported.
- If an app creates a mutable pending intent with an intent that doesn't specify a component or package, the system now throws an exception.
These changes prevent malicious apps from intercepting implicit intents that are intended for use by an app's internal components.
For example, here is an intent filter that could be declared in your app's manifest file:
<activity
android:name=".AppActivity"
android:exported="false">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="com.example.action.APP_ACTION" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
</intent-filter>
</activity>
If your app tried to launch this activity using an implicit intent, an exception would be thrown:
Kotlin
// Throws an exception when targeting Android 14. context.startActivity(Intent("com.example.action.APP_ACTION"))
Java
// Throws an exception when targeting Android 14. context.startActivity(new Intent("com.example.action.APP_ACTION"));
To launch the non-exported activity, your app should use an explicit intent instead:
Kotlin
// This makes the intent explicit. val explicitIntent = Intent("com.example.action.APP_ACTION") explicitIntent.apply { package = context.packageName } context.startActivity(explicitIntent)
Java
// This makes the intent explicit. Intent explicitIntent = new Intent("com.example.action.APP_ACTION") explicitIntent.setPackage(context.getPackageName()); context.startActivity(explicitIntent);
在运行时注册的广播接收器必须指定导出行为
Apps and services that target Android 14 and use context-registered
receivers are
required to specify a flag to indicate whether or not the receiver should be
exported to all other apps on the device: either RECEIVER_EXPORTED
or
RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED
, respectively. This requirement helps protect apps
from security vulnerabilities by leveraging the features for these receivers
introduced in Android 13.
Exception for receivers that receive only system broadcasts
If your app is registering a receiver only for system
broadcasts through
Context#registerReceiver
methods, such as
Context#registerReceiver()
,
then it shouldn't specify a flag when registering the receiver.
更安全的动态代码加载
If your app targets Android 14 and uses Dynamic Code Loading (DCL), all dynamically-loaded files must be marked as read-only. Otherwise, the system throws an exception. We recommend that apps avoid dynamically loading code whenever possible, as doing so greatly increases the risk that an app can be compromised by code injection or code tampering.
If you must dynamically load code, use the following approach to set the dynamically-loaded file (such as a DEX, JAR, or APK file) as read-only as soon as the file is opened and before any content is written:
Kotlin
val jar = File("DYNAMICALLY_LOADED_FILE.jar") val os = FileOutputStream(jar) os.use { // Set the file to read-only first to prevent race conditions jar.setReadOnly() // Then write the actual file content } val cl = PathClassLoader(jar, parentClassLoader)
Java
File jar = new File("DYNAMICALLY_LOADED_FILE.jar"); try (FileOutputStream os = new FileOutputStream(jar)) { // Set the file to read-only first to prevent race conditions jar.setReadOnly(); // Then write the actual file content } catch (IOException e) { ... } PathClassLoader cl = new PathClassLoader(jar, parentClassLoader);
Handle dynamically-loaded files that already exist
To prevent exceptions from being thrown for existing dynamically-loaded files, we recommend deleting and recreating the files before you try to dynamically load them again in your app. As you recreate the files, follow the preceding guidance for marking the files read-only at write time. Alternatively, you can re-label the existing files as read-only, but in this case, we strongly recommend that you verify the integrity of the files first (for example, by checking the file's signature against a trusted value), to help protect your app from malicious actions.
压缩路径遍历
对于以 Android 14 为目标平台的应用,Android 会通过以下方式防止 Zip 路径遍历漏洞:如果 Zip 文件条目名称包含“..”或以“/”开头,ZipFile(String)
和 ZipInputStream.getNextEntry()
会抛出 ZipException
。
应用可以通过调用 dalvik.system.ZipPathValidator.clearCallback()
选择停用此验证。
针对从后台启动 activity 的其他限制
For apps targeting Android 14, the system further restricts when apps are allowed to start activities from the background:
- When an app sends a
PendingIntent
usingPendingIntent#send()
or similar methods, the app must now opt in if it wants to grant its own background activity launch privileges to start the pending intent. To opt in, the app should pass anActivityOptions
bundle withsetPendingIntentBackgroundActivityStartMode(MODE_BACKGROUND_ACTIVITY_START_ALLOWED)
. - When a visible app binds a service of another app that's in the background
using the
bindService()
method, the visible app must now opt in if it wants to grant its own background activity launch privileges to the bound service. To opt in, the app should include theBIND_ALLOW_ACTIVITY_STARTS
flag when calling thebindService()
method.
These changes expand the existing set of restrictions to protect users by preventing malicious apps from abusing APIs to start disruptive activities from the background.
更新后的非 SDK 限制
Android 14 包含更新后的受限非 SDK 接口列表(基于与 Android 开发者之间的协作以及最新的内部测试)。在限制使用非 SDK 接口之前,我们会尽可能确保有可用的公开替代方案。
如果您的应用并非以 Android 14 为目标平台,其中一些变更可能不会立即对您产生影响。然而,虽然您目前仍可以使用一些非 SDK 接口(具体取决于应用的目标 API 级别),但只要您使用任何非 SDK 方法或字段,终归存在导致应用出问题的显著风险。
如果您不确定自己的应用是否使用了非 SDK 接口,则可以测试您的应用来进行确认。如果您的应用依赖于非 SDK 接口,您应该开始计划迁移到 SDK 替代方案。然而,我们知道某些应用具有使用非 SDK 接口的有效用例。如果您无法为应用中的某项功能找到使用非 SDK 接口的替代方案,应请求新的公共 API。
如需详细了解此 Android 版本中的变更,请参阅 Android 14 中有关限制非 SDK 接口的更新。如需全面了解有关非 SDK 接口的详细信息,请参阅对非 SDK 接口的限制。