与之前的版本一样,Android 16 包含一些行为变更,这些变更可能会影响您的应用。以下行为变更仅影响以 Android 16 或更高版本为目标平台的应用。如果您的应用以 Android 16 或更高版本为目标平台,您应该修改自己的应用以支持这些行为(如果适用)。
请务必查看对 Android 16 上运行的所有应用都有影响的行为变更列表(无论应用的 targetSdkVersion
如何)。
用户体验和系统界面
Android 16(API 级别 36)包含以下变更,旨在打造更一致、更直观的用户体验。
无边框设计选择退出功能即将停用
Android 15 强制执行全屏显示,以针对 Android 15(API 级别 35)的应用为目标平台,但您的应用可以通过将 R.attr#windowOptOutEdgeToEdgeEnforcement
设置为 true
来选择停用。对于以 Android 16(API 级别 36)为目标平台的应用,R.attr#windowOptOutEdgeToEdgeEnforcement
已被废弃并停用,并且您的应用无法选择不采用从边缘到边缘的布局。
- 如果您的应用以 Android 16(API 级别 36)为目标平台,并且在 Android 15 设备上运行,则
R.attr#windowOptOutEdgeToEdgeEnforcement
会继续正常运行。 - 如果您的应用以 Android 16(API 级别 36)为目标平台,并且在 Android 16 设备上运行,则
R.attr#windowOptOutEdgeToEdgeEnforcement
会被停用。
如需在 Android 16 中进行测试,请确保您的应用支持无边框设计,并移除所有 R.attr#windowOptOutEdgeToEdgeEnforcement
用法,以便您的应用在 Android 15 设备上也能支持无边框设计。如需支持从边缘到边缘的显示,请参阅 Compose 和 View 指南。
预测性返回需要迁移或选择停用
For apps targeting Android 16 (API level 36) or higher and running on an
Android 16 or higher device, the predictive back system animations
(back-to-home, cross-task, and cross-activity) are enabled by default.
Additionally, onBackPressed
is not called and
KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BACK
is not dispatched anymore.
If your app intercepts the back event and you haven't migrated to predictive
back yet, update your app to use supported back navigation APIs, or
temporarily opt out by setting the
android:enableOnBackInvokedCallback
attribute to false
in the
<application>
or <activity>
tag of your app's AndroidManifest.xml
file.
优雅字体 API 已弃用并停用
以 Android 15(API 级别 35)为目标平台的应用默认将 elegantTextHeight
TextView
属性设置为 true
,从而将紧凑型字体替换为可读性更高的字体。您可以通过将 elegantTextHeight
属性设置为 false
来替换此设置。
Android 16 弃用了 elegantTextHeight
属性,当您的应用以 Android 16 为目标平台后,系统会忽略该属性。由这些 API 控制的“界面字体”即将停用,因此您应调整所有布局,以确保阿拉伯语、老挝语、缅甸语、泰米尔语、古吉拉特语、卡纳达语、马拉雅拉姆语、奥里亚语、泰卢固语或泰语文本的呈现效果一致且不受未来变化的影响。
elegantTextHeight
属性设置为 false
替换默认值的应用,
elegantTextHeight
行为。elegantTextHeight
属性设置为 false
来替换默认值的应用,其 elegantTextHeight
行为。
核心功能
Android 16(API 级别 36)包含以下变更,这些变更会修改或扩展 Android 系统的各种核心功能。
固定费率工作安排优化
在以 Android 16 为目标平台之前,如果 scheduleAtFixedRate
因不在有效的进程生命周期内而错过了任务执行,则当应用返回到有效的生命周期时,所有错过的执行会立即执行。
以 Android 16 为目标平台时,当应用返回到有效的生命周期时,系统会立即执行最多 1 次未执行的 scheduleAtFixedRate
执行。此行为变更预计会提升应用性能。在您的应用中测试此行为,检查您的应用是否受到影响。您还可以使用应用兼容性框架并启用 STPE_SKIP_MULTIPLE_MISSED_PERIODIC_TASKS
兼容性标志进行测试。
设备规格
Android 16(API 级别 36)在应用显示在大屏设备上时,包含以下变更。
自适应布局
现在,Android 应用可在各种设备(例如手机、平板电脑、可折叠设备、桌面设备、汽车和电视)上运行,并且在大屏设备上支持多种窗口模式(例如分屏和桌面窗口),因此开发者应构建能够适应任何屏幕和窗口尺寸的 Android 应用,无论设备方向如何。在当今多设备的世界中,限制屏幕方向和尺寸可调整性等范式过于严格。
忽略屏幕方向、尺寸可调整性和宽高比限制
对于以 Android 16(API 级别 36)为目标平台的应用,Android 16 包含对系统管理屏幕方向、尺寸调整能力和宽高比限制的方式的变更。在最小宽度大于或等于 600dp 的显示屏上,这些限制不再适用。应用还会填满整个显示窗口,无论宽高比或用户偏好的屏幕方向如何,都不会使用竖条模式。
此变更引入了新的标准平台行为。Android 正在向一种模型转变,在该模型中,应用需要适应各种屏幕方向、显示大小和宽高比。固定屏幕方向或有限的尺寸可调整性等限制会阻碍应用的适应性,因此我们建议让应用具备自适应能力,以提供尽可能出色的用户体验。
您还可以使用应用兼容性框架并启用 UNIVERSAL_RESIZABLE_BY_DEFAULT
兼容性标志来测试此行为。
常见的重大更改
忽略屏幕方向、可调整大小性和宽高比限制可能会影响应用在某些设备上的界面,尤其是那些专为锁定为纵向的小布局设计的元素,例如布局拉伸、动画和组件超出屏幕等问题。任何关于宽高比或屏幕方向的假设都可能导致应用出现视觉问题。详细了解如何避免这些问题并改进应用的自适应行为。
允许设备旋转会导致更多 activity 重新创建,如果未正确保留,可能会导致用户状态丢失。如需了解如何正确保存界面状态,请参阅保存界面状态。
实现细节
在全屏模式和多窗口模式下,以下清单属性和运行时 API 会被大屏设备忽略:
screenOrientation
resizableActivity
minAspectRatio
maxAspectRatio
setRequestedOrientation()
getRequestedOrientation()
系统会忽略 screenOrientation
、setRequestedOrientation()
和 getRequestedOrientation()
的以下值:
portrait
reversePortrait
sensorPortrait
userPortrait
landscape
reverseLandscape
sensorLandscape
userLandscape
对于显示屏可调整大小性,android:resizeableActivity="false"
、android:minAspectRatio
和 android:maxAspectRatio
没有影响。
对于以 Android 16(API 级别 36)为目标平台的应用,默认情况下,大屏设备会忽略应用屏幕方向、可调整尺寸性和宽高比限制,但尚未完全准备就绪的每个应用都可以选择停用此行为,从而暂时替换此行为(这会导致应用采用之前的行为,即放置在兼容模式下)。
异常
在以下情况下,Android 16 的屏幕方向、尺寸调整能力和宽高比限制不适用:
- 游戏(基于
android:appCategory
标志) - 用户在设备的宽高比设置中明确选择启用应用的默认行为
- 小于
sw600dp
的屏幕
暂时停用
如需选择停用特定 activity,请声明 PROPERTY_COMPAT_ALLOW_RESTRICTED_RESIZABILITY
清单属性:
<activity ...>
<property android:name="android.window.PROPERTY_COMPAT_ALLOW_RESTRICTED_RESIZABILITY" android:value="true" />
...
</activity>
如果您的应用有太多部分尚未准备好支持 Android 16,您可以在应用级别应用相同的属性,从而完全选择不启用该功能:
<application ...>
<property android:name="android.window.PROPERTY_COMPAT_ALLOW_RESTRICTED_RESIZABILITY" android:value="true" />
</application>
健康与健身
Android 16(API 级别 36)包含与健康和健身数据相关的以下变更。
健康与健身权限
对于以 Android 16(API 级别 36)或更高版本为目标平台的应用,BODY_SENSORS
权限使用 android.permissions.health
下更精细的权限,健康数据共享也使用这些权限。自 Android 16 起,凡是以前需要 BODY_SENSORS
或 BODY_SENSORS_BACKGROUND
的 API,现在都需要获取相应的 android.permissions.health
权限。这会影响以下数据类型、API 和前台服务类型:
HEART_RATE_BPM
来自 Wear OS 健康服务- 来自 Android 传感器管理器的
Sensor.TYPE_HEART_RATE
- 在 Wear OS 上,
ProtoLayout
中的heartRateAccuracy
和heartRateBpm
FOREGROUND_SERVICE_TYPE_HEALTH
,其中需要使用相应的android.permission.health
权限来代替BODY_SENSORS
如果您的应用使用这些 API,则应请求相应的精细权限:
- 对于使用期间的心率、血氧饱和度或体表温度监测:请求
android.permissions.health
下的精细权限,例如READ_HEART_RATE
,而不是BODY_SENSORS
。 - 对于后台传感器访问权限:请求
READ_HEALTH_DATA_IN_BACKGROUND
而不是BODY_SENSORS_BACKGROUND
。
这些权限与用于保护对 Health Connect(Android 健康、健身和身心状态数据存储区)中数据的读取访问权限相同。
移动应用
迁移到使用 READ_HEART_RATE
和其他精细权限的移动应用还必须声明 activity 以显示应用的隐私权政策。此要求与健康数据共享的要求相同。
连接
Android 16(API 级别 36)在蓝牙堆栈中进行了以下更改,以改善与外围设备的连接。
用于处理绑定丢失和加密更改的新 intent
As part of the Improved bond loss handling, Android 16 also introduces 2 new intents to provide apps with greater awareness of bond loss and encryption changes.
Apps targeting Android 16 can now:
- Receive an
ACTION_KEY_MISSING
intent when remote bond loss is detected, allowing them to provide more informative user feedback and take appropriate actions. - Receive an
ACTION_ENCRYPTION_CHANGE
intent whenever encryption status of the link changes. This includes encryption status change, encryption algorithm change, and encryption key size change. Apps must consider the bond restored if the link is successfully encrypted upon receivingACTION_ENCRYPTION_CHANGE
intent later.
Adapting to varying OEM implementations
While Android 16 introduces these new intents, their implementation and broadcasting can vary across different device manufacturers (OEMs). To ensure your app provides a consistent and reliable experience across all devices, developers should design their bond loss handling to gracefully adapt to these potential variations.
We recommend the following app behaviors:
If the
ACTION_KEY_MISSING
intent is broadcast:The ACL (Asynchronous Connection-Less) link will be disconnected by the system, but the bond information for the device will be retained (as described here).
Your app should use this intent as the primary signal for bond loss detection and guiding the user to confirm the remote device is in range before initiating device forgetting or re-pairing.
If a device disconnects after
ACTION_KEY_MISSING
is received, your app should be cautious about reconnecting, as the device may no longer be bonded with the system.If the
ACTION_KEY_MISSING
intent is NOT broadcast:The ACL link will remain connected, and the bond information for the device will be removed by the system, same to behavior in Android 15.
In this scenario, your app should continue its existing bond loss handling mechanisms as in previous Android releases, to detect and manage bond loss events.
移除蓝牙绑定的新方式
All apps targeting Android 16 are now able to unpair bluetooth devices using a
public API in CompanionDeviceManager
. If a companion device is
being managed as a CDM association, then the app can trigger
bluetooth bond removal by using the new removeBond(int)
API
on the associated device. The app can monitor the bond state changes by
listening to the bluetooth device broadcast event
ACTION_BOND_STATE_CHANGED
.
安全
Android 16(API 级别 36)包含以下安全方面的变更。
MediaStore 版本锁定
对于以 Android 16 或更高版本为目标平台的应用,MediaStore#getVersion()
现在将是每个应用的唯一标识。这会从版本字符串中移除标识属性,以防止滥用和用于指纹识别技术。应用不应对此版本的格式做出任何假设。在使用此 API 时,应用应已处理版本变更,并且在大多数情况下无需更改其当前行为,除非开发者尝试推断超出此 API 预期范围的其他信息。
更安全的 intent
“更安全的 intent”功能是一项多阶段安全计划,旨在提升 Android 的 intent 解析机制的安全性。目标是在 intent 处理期间添加检查,并过滤不符合特定条件的 intent,从而保护应用免受恶意操作的侵害。
在 Android 15 中,该功能侧重于发送应用,现在在 Android 16 中,控制权转移到了接收应用,允许开发者使用其应用清单选择启用严格的 intent 解析。
我们正在实施两项关键变更:
显式 intent 必须与目标组件的 intent 过滤器相匹配:如果 intent 显式定位到某个组件,则应与该组件的 intent 过滤器相匹配。
没有操作的 intent 无法匹配任何 intent 过滤器:未指定操作的 intent 不应解析为任何 intent 过滤器。
这些变更仅在涉及多个应用时适用,不会影响单个应用内的 intent 处理。
影响
选择启用性质意味着,开发者必须在应用清单中明确启用它,才能使其生效。 因此,此功能的影响将仅限于以下应用(开发者):
- 了解“更安全的 intent”功能及其优势。
- 主动选择在应用中采用更严格的 intent 处理实践。
这种选择性采用的方法可最大限度地降低破坏可能依赖于当前不太安全的 intent 解析行为的现有应用的风险。
虽然在 Android 16 中,初始影响可能有限,但“更安全的 intent”计划的路线图显示,未来 Android 版本中会产生更广泛的影响。我们计划最终将严格的 intent 解析设为默认行为。
“更安全的 intent”功能可让恶意应用更难利用 intent 解析机制中的漏洞,从而显著提升 Android 生态系统的安全性。
不过,向选择退出和强制执行的过渡必须谨慎管理,以解决现有应用的潜在兼容性问题。
实现
开发者需要在应用清单中使用 intentMatchingFlags
属性明确启用更严格的 intent 匹配。
以下示例展示了如何为整个应用选择启用该功能,但在接收器上停用/选择停用该功能:
<application android:intentMatchingFlags="enforceIntentFilter">
<receiver android:name=".MyBroadcastReceiver" android:exported="true" android:intentMatchingFlags="none">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="com.example.MY_CUSTOM_ACTION" />
</intent-filter>
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="com.example.MY_ANOTHER_CUSTOM_ACTION" />
</intent-filter>
</receiver>
</application>
有关支持的标志的更多信息:
标志名称 | 说明 |
---|---|
enforceIntentFilter | 对传入的 intent 强制执行更严格的匹配 |
none | 停用针对传入 intent 的所有特殊匹配规则。指定多个标志时,系统会优先考虑“无”标志,以解决值冲突问题 |
allowNullAction | 放宽了匹配规则,允许匹配没有操作的 intent。此标志与“enforceIntentFilter”结合使用可实现特定行为 |
测试和调试
在强制执行处于有效状态时,如果 intent 调用方已正确填充 intent,应用应能正常运行。
不过,被屏蔽的 intent 会触发警告日志消息(例如 "Intent does not match component's intent filter:"
和 "Access blocked:"
),并带有标记 "PackageManager."
。这表示存在可能会影响应用的潜在问题,需要引起注意。
Logcat 过滤条件:
tag=:PackageManager & (message:"Intent does not match component's intent filter:" | message: "Access blocked:")
GPU 系统调用过滤
To harden the Mali GPU surface, Mali GPU IOCTLs that have been deprecated or are intended solely for GPU development have been blocked in production builds. Additionally, IOCTLs used for GPU profiling have been restricted to the shell process or debuggable applications. Refer to the SAC update for more details on the platform-level policy.
This change takes place on Pixel devices using the Mali GPU (Pixel 6-9). Arm
has provided official categorization of their IOCTLs in
Documentation/ioctl-categories.rst
of their r54p2 release. This
list will continue to be maintained in future driver releases.
This change does not impact supported graphics APIs (including Vulkan and OpenGL), and is not expected to impact developers or existing applications. GPU profiling tools such as the Streamline Performance Analyzer and the Android GPU Inspector won't be affected.
Testing
If you see a SELinux denial similar to the following, it is likely your application has been impacted by this change:
06-30 10:47:18.617 20360 20360 W roidJUnitRunner: type=1400 audit(0.0:85): avc: denied { ioctl }
for path="/dev/mali0" dev="tmpfs" ino=1188 ioctlcmd=0x8023
scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
permissive=0 app=com.google.android.selinux.pts
If your application needs to use blocked IOCTLs, please file a bug and assign it to android-partner-security@google.com.
FAQ
Does this policy change apply to all OEMs? This change will be opt-in, but available to any OEMs who would like to use this hardening method. Instructions for implementing the change can be found in the implementation documentation.
Is it mandatory to make changes in the OEM codebase to implement this, or does it come with a new AOSP release by default? The platform-level change will come with a new AOSP release by default. Vendors may opt-in to this change in their codebase if they would like to apply it.
Are SoCs responsible for keeping the IOCTL list up to date? For example, if my device uses an ARM Mali GPU, would I need to reach out to ARM for any of the changes? Individual SoCs must update their IOCTL lists per device upon driver release. For example, ARM will update their published IOCTL list upon driver updates. However, OEMs should make sure that they incorporate the updates in their SEPolicy, and add any selected custom IOCTLs to the lists as needed.
Does this change apply to all Pixel in-market devices automatically, or is a user action required to toggle something to apply this change? This change applies to all Pixel in-market devices using the Mali GPU (Pixel 6-9). No user action is required to apply this change.
Will use of this policy impact the performance of the kernel driver? This policy was tested on the Mali GPU using GFXBench, and no measurable change to GPU performance was observed.
Is it necessary for the IOCTL list to align with the current userspace and kernel driver versions? Yes, the list of allowed IOCTLs must be synchronized with the IOCTLs supported by both the userspace and kernel drivers. If the IOCTLs in the user space or kernel driver are updated, the SEPolicy IOCTL list must be updated to match.
ARM has categorized IOCTLs as 'restricted' / 'instrumentation', but we want to use some of them in production use-cases, and/or deny others. Individual OEMs/SoCs are responsible for deciding on how to categorize the IOCTLs they use, based on the configuration of their userspace Mali libraries. ARM's list can be used to help decide on these, but each OEM/SoC's use-case may be different.
隐私权
Android 16(API 级别 36)包含以下隐私权方面的变更。
本地网络权限
Devices on the LAN can be accessed by any app that has the INTERNET
permission.
This makes it easy for apps to connect to local devices but it also has privacy
implications such as forming a fingerprint of the user, and being a proxy for
location.
The Local Network Protections project aims to protect the user's privacy by gating access to the local network behind a new runtime permission.
Release plan
This change will be deployed between two releases, 25Q2 and TBD respectively. It is imperative that developers follow this guidance for 25Q2 and share feedback because these protections will be enforced at a later Android release. Moreover, they will need to update scenarios which depend on implicit local network access by using the following guidance and prepare for user rejection and revocation of the new permission.
Impact
At the current stage, LNP is an opt-in feature which means only the apps that opt in will be affected. The goal of the opt-in phase is for app developers to understand which parts of their app depend on implicit local network access such that they can prepare to permission guard them for the next release.
Apps will be affected if they access the user's local network using:
- Direct or library use of raw sockets on local network addresses (e.g. mDNS or SSDP service discovery protocol)
- Use of framework level classes that access the local network (e.g. NsdManager)
Traffic to and from a local network address requires local network access permission. The following table lists some common cases:
App Low Level Network Operation | Local Network Permission Required |
---|---|
Making an outgoing TCP connection | yes |
Accepting incoming TCP connections | yes |
Sending a UDP unicast, multicast, broadcast | yes |
Receiving an incoming UDP unicast, multicast, broadcast | yes |
These restrictions are implemented deep in the networking stack, and thus they apply to all networking APIs. This includes sockets created in native or managed code, networking libraries like Cronet and OkHttp, and any APIs implemented on top of those. Trying to resolve services on the local network (i.e. those with a .local suffix) will require local network permission.
Exceptions to the rules above:
- If a device's DNS server is on a local network, traffic to or from it (at port 53) doesn't require local network access permission.
- Applications using Output Switcher as their in-app picker won't need local network permissions (more guidance to come in 2025Q4).
Developer Guidance (Opt-in)
To opt into local network restrictions, do the following:
- Flash the device to a build with 25Q2 Beta 3 or later.
- Install the app to be tested.
Toggle the Appcompat flag in adb:
adb shell am compat enable RESTRICT_LOCAL_NETWORK <package_name>
Reboot The device
Now your app's access to the local network is restricted and any attempt to access the local network will lead to socket errors. If you are using APIs that perform local network operations outside of your app process (ex: NsdManager), they won't be impacted during the opt-in phase.
To restore access, you must grant your app permission to NEARBY_WIFI_DEVICES
.
- Ensure the app declares the
NEARBY_WIFI_DEVICES
permission in its manifest. - Go to Settings > Apps > [Application Name] > Permissions > Nearby devices > Allow.
Now your app's access to the local network should be restored and all your scenarios should work as they did prior to opting the app in.
Once enforcement for local network protection begins, here is how the app network traffic will be impacted.
Permission | Outbound LAN Request | Outbound/Inbound Internet Request | Inbound LAN Request |
---|---|---|---|
Granted | Works | Works | Works |
Not Granted | Fails | Works | Fails |
Use the following command to toggle-off the App-Compat flag
adb shell am compat disable RESTRICT_LOCAL_NETWORK <package_name>
Errors
Errors arising from these restrictions will be returned to the calling socket whenever it invokes send or a send variant to a local network address.
Example errors:
sendto failed: EPERM (Operation not permitted)
sendto failed: ECONNABORTED (Operation not permitted)
Local Network Definition
A local network in this project refers to an IP network that utilizes a broadcast-capable network interface, such as Wi-Fi or Ethernet, but excludes cellular (WWAN) or VPN connections.
The following are considered local networks:
IPv4:
- 169.254.0.0/16 // Link Local
- 100.64.0.0/10 // CGNAT
- 10.0.0.0/8 // RFC1918
- 172.16.0.0/12 // RFC1918
- 192.168.0.0/16 // RFC1918
IPv6:
- Link-local
- Directly-connected routes
- Stub networks like Thread
- Multiple-subnets (TBD)
Additionally, both multicast addresses (224.0.0.0/4, ff00::/8) and the IPv4 broadcast address (255.255.255.255) are classified as local network addresses.
应用拥有的照片
当面向 SDK 36 或更高版本的应用在搭载 Android 16 或更高版本的设备上提示用户授予照片和视频权限时,如果用户选择限制对所选媒体的访问权限,则会在照片选择器中看到该应用拥有的所有照片。用户可以取消选择任何这些预选项,这会撤消该应用对这些照片和视频的访问权限。